




























Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Craigie, J. (2015). A fine balance: reconsidering patient autonomy in light of the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. Bioethics, 29(6), 398-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12133
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 21. Apr. 2021
A FINE BALANCE: RECONSIDERING PATIENT AUTONOMY IN LIGHT OF





UN Convention on the







The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is increasingly
seen as driving a paradigm shift in mental health law, particularly in relation
to the understanding that it requires a shift from substituted to supported
decisions. This article identifies two competing moral commitments implied
by this shift, both of which appeal to the notion of autonomy. It is argued that
because of these commitments the Convention is in tension with more
general calls in the medical ethics literature for preserving patient autonomy
through support. The competing commitments within the Convention also
present a particular challenge in putting the support it requires into practice.
A discursive control account of freedom is used to develop some practical
guidelines for navigating this new moral territory.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the importance placed on respect for patient
autonomy in medicine, there remains considerable uncer-
tainty about what practices constitute a transgression of
this principle. Recent years have seen the rise of calls in
the medical ethics literature for greater involvement of
healthcare professionals in patients’ decisions, in the
name of autonomy. This development has constituted a
shift, to some degree, back towards a more traditional
role for professionals in treatment decision-making, away
from the minimal role in standard informed consent
models. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)1 represents an impor-
tant development in the area of mental health law, and in
this article I examine its implications for our understand-
ing of what respect for patient autonomy requires, par-
ticularly in relation to decision-making support.
The CRPD has been widely interpreted as requiring a
shift from legal structures that involve the transfer of
personal decision-making (including treatment decisions)
to a substitute decision-maker, on grounds of mental
disorder or mental incapacity, to structures that instead
support the person in making their own decision.2 Focus-
ing on the concept of autonomy, I develop an account of
the moral basis for this prescribed shift. This account
points to an important difference between the evaluative
commitments underlying the Convention, and those
motivating the calls in the medical ethics literature for
preserving patient autonomy through support. This dif-
ference means that the CRPD represents a new develop-
ment in debates about patient autonomy, distinct from
the shift already occurring in the medical ethics literature
towards supported decision-making. The account also
identifies a tension within the Convention, which presents
a particular challenge in putting the support it requires
into practice.
THE CRPD: FROM SUBSTITUTED TO
SUPPORTED DECISIONS
The current approach to preserving patient autonomy
through the law in England and Wales, largely adopts a
policy of non-interference in adults’ treatment decisions,
1 The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly in December 2006.
2 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
General comment No 1 (2014) Article 12: Equal recognition before the
law; Australian Law Reform Commission. Discussion Paper 81: Equal-
ity, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 2014, ss. 2.69–2.80.
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unless the person is judged to lack mental capacity in
relation to the decision, or unless they have a mental
disorder of a kind and degree that authorizes their deten-
tion and treatment in hospital. The first kind of case falls
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), the second
under the Mental Health Act 1983 as amended by the
Mental Health Act 2007 (MHA). In both contexts the
relevant decisions are transferred to a substitute decision-
maker, and under the MCA there is an explicit require-
ment that these decisions must be in the patient’s best
interests.3 The best interests assessment must take into
consideration the person’s past and present wishes, feel-
ings, beliefs and values insofar as these are ‘reasonably
ascertainable’.4 However, the weight that can be placed
on the their current wishes is limited by the fact that the
starting point for the assessment is a judgment that the
person’s mental state means that they are currently
unable to make the decision for themselves.5
This kind of approach to instances where a person’s
ability to make a personal decision is apparently impaired
stands in contrast with that envisaged in the CRPD. The
Convention adopts a social model of disability according
to which a person’s context plays a necessary part in
explaining their disability. The preamble to the Conven-
tion describes disability as resulting from, ‘the interaction
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and
environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others’
(section e). Together with this background conceptual
framework, Articles 12, 14 and 17 of the Convention have
been interpreted as the elements that are particularly rel-
evant to the MCA and MHA. Article 14 prohibits restric-
tions of liberty based, in part or whole, on mental
disability; and Article 17 requires that the right to respect
for one’s own physical and mental integrity applies to
people with disabilities on an equal basis with others.6
However, most directly relevant to the substituted
decision-making structures of the MCA and MHA,
Article 12 provides that ‘persons with disabilities enjoy
legal capacity on an equal basis with others is all aspects
of life’ (12(2)); and requires states to ‘take appropriate
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to
the support they may require in exercising their legal
capacity.’ (12(3))
The implications for law in England and Wales are yet
to be established. However, commentators have sug-
gested that compliance will require a shift, at least to
some extent, from the binary substituted decision-making
structures of the MCA and MHA towards a supported
decision-making approach, in which treatment decisions
are made by the patient with the help of others.7 For
example, Genevra Richardson writes that understood in
its purist sense:
[Article 12] would demand that the law respect a per-
son’s decision, however disabled that person’s mental
powers might be, and however damaging the conse-
quences of the decision. In practice, and in reflection of
the social model, Article 12 would require the person to
be supported in making her decision, and it would be
the decision that emerged from this support that would
attract legal effect.8
Adopting this interpretation of the Convention, in a
report written for the Law Commission of Ontario,
Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner propose that, ‘the
question can no longer be: Does a person have mental
capacity to exercise their legal capacity? . . . Rather, the
question is: What types of supports are required for the
person to exercise his or her legal capacity?’9
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING
In a General Comment on Article 12, the CRPD Com-
mittee defined support very broadly as encompassing
‘both informal and formal support arrangements, of
varying types and intensity’, including peer support,
advocacy, help with communication, and the deferral of
decisions to a trusted person.10 A number of supported
decision-making models have begun to be developed in
response to the CRPD, two prominent ones being Bach
and Kerzner’s model developed for the Law Commission
of Ontario,11 and the Supported Decision Making model
trialled for the Office of the Public Advocate in South
Australia.12 In Bach and Kerzner’s model, support aims
to facilitate the person with a disability: (1) in formulat-
ing their values and aims, exploring the possibilities and
making a decision; (2) in engaging other parties and
giving a decision effect; and (3) in acting on decisions
3 This is not an explicit requirement of the MHA. See for discussion:
G. Richardson. Capacity in the shadow of suicide: what can the law do?
Int J Law Context. 2013; 9: 87–105.
4 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 4(6).
5 G. Richardson. Mental disabilities and the law: from substituted to
supported decision-making? Curr Leg Prob 2012; 65(1): 333–351.
6 For discussion see previous note.
7 P. Bartlett. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and Mental Health Law. Mod Law Rev 2013; 75:
752–778; Richardson, op. cit. note 3.
8 Richardson, op. cit. note 5: 16–17.
9 M. Bach & L. Kerzner. A new paradigm for protecting autonomy
and the right to legal capacity. A report prepared for the Law Commis-
sion of Ontario 2010; 58.
10 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. op. cit. note 2:
parra. 15. For a recent discussion of ‘support’ as conceived of in the
CRPD, see sections 2.69–2.71 and 2.75 of the Australian Law Reform
Commission Discussion Paper, op. cit. note 2.
11 op. cit. note 9.
12 M. Wallace. Evaluation of the Supported Decision Making Project.
Adelaide: Office of the Public Advocate 2012.
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and meeting agreements that have been entered into.13
Supporters are appointed by the person with a disability
or by an administrative tribunal, within a legal structure
that allows little room for substituted decisions,14 and
they may be friends, family or other parties.15
The model developed and trialed in South Australia
focused more narrowly on supporting people with mental
disabilities to access information and consider the
potential consequences of the options – by acting as a
‘sounding board’ – before they made a choice (although
supporters also sometimes acted as an advocate to help
the person achieve their goals).16 Supporters were chosen
by the person being supported, and were almost always
family or friends.17 The model was conceived of as one
element in a ‘stepped’ legal structure for decision-making
in which substituted decisions remained a part.18
However, the trial involved support offered to people
who were already making their own decisions, as well as
support as an alternative to guardianship (substituted
decisions) in selected cases.19
On the face of it, these models seem to fit well with the
increasing prominence in the medical ethics literature, of
accounts calling for healthcare professionals to be more
involved in patients’ decisions.20 The models developed as
a result of the CRPD concern a broader set of decisions,
and tend to focus on family and friends as supporters
rather than professionals.21 But both literatures recognize
a positive role for others in personal decision-making. In
the medical ethics literature, Marian Verkerk, for
example, calls for the active involvement of healthcare
professionals in patients decisions, on the basis that inter-
personal relationships can facilitate autonomy by
‘enhancing the capacity of people to define who they are,
to understand themselves and to direct their lives.’22
Adopting a stronger line, Alisdair Maclean has argued
that healthcare professionals, ‘should be under a legal
duty to persuade their patients to change their minds
when they have made an apparently irrational decision’.23
According to Maclean, this kind of involvement can help
patients ‘realise their goals and be consistent with their
values and choices’,24 and such forms of intervention are
justified because they therefore facilitate autonomous
decision-making. Both Maclean and Verkerk argue that
standard informed consent procedures run the risk of
treatment decisions not being autonomous, and that this
calls for a supported decision-making approach.
Like these accounts, the CRPD literature justifies
support with reference to the importance of autonomy,
holding, for example, that the support required by the
Convention seeks to ‘enable autonomous (not merely
willful) decisions, encompassing reflection on and reason-
ing in light of one’s values’.25 However, a closer examina-
tion of the CRPD position on autonomy reveals a tension
between the moral commitments expressed in the Con-
vention, and those expressed in the calls for support by
Verkerk, Maclean and others in the medical ethics litera-
ture. This tension is brought to light by distinguishing
between two widely-recognized senses of autonomy, and
the relative importance attributed to them in these two
contexts.
TWO SENSES OF AUTONOMY
The principle of respect for autonomy is traditionally
understood to refer to the moral importance of not being
governed by others: the liberty to make one’s own deci-
sions. However, it is also widely accepted that making
13 Achieving these aims is described as potentially involving help with
life planning, assistance in communication, advocacy in relation to
wishes, the representation of the person with a mental disability as a
person, relationship and community building, and making administra-
tive arrangements. op. cit. note 9: 73.
14 Substituted decisions are replaced by what Bach and Kerzner call
‘facilitated decisions’. op. cit. note 9: 91–93.
15 op. cit. note 9: 78.
16 Wallace. op. cit. note 12: 4, 24.
17 The final report raises the possibility that community service organi-
sations might be an alternative source of supporters. In the trial, the
project leader took over the role of supporter for a number of partici-
pants. Wallace. op. cit. note 12: 24.
18 Wallace. op. cit. note 12: 6, 45–46.
19 The trial included only participants with an intellectual disability,
acquired brain injury or neurological disease. People with a primary
diagnosis of mental illness or degenerative dementia were excluded
(Wallace. op. cit. note 12: 9–10). Selection for inclusion in the trial also
required that the participant was not involved in serious conflict with
family or friends (Wallace. op. cit. note 12: 15).
20 This can be seen, for example, in the General Medical Council’s
guidance on consent when it was updated in 2008 from a document
entitled Seeking patients’ consent: the ethical considerations, to Consent:
patients and doctors making decisions together.
21 However, in the South Australian trial the project coordinator took
on the role of supporter for a number of participants when their family
or friend supporters withdrew from the trial for a range of reasons, for
example see ‘Alex’s story’ (Wallace op. cit. note 12: 22–24).
22 Verkerk argues for the particular importance of this kind of involve-
ment by healthcare professionals when a person has a psychiatric dis-
order, on grounds of the difficulties this often brings in terms of the
person’s ability to sustain flourishing relationships. M. Verkerk. A care
perspective on coercion and autonomy. Bioethics 1999; 13: 358–368:
367.
23 A. Maclean. Autonomy, consent and persuasion. Eur J Health Law
2006; 13: 321–338: 321.
24 Ibid: 337.
25 S. Wilderman. Protecting rights and building capacities: Challenges
of global mental health policy in light of the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, J Law Med Ethics 2013; 41(1): 48–73; P.
Gooding. Supported decision-making: A rights-based disability concept
and its implications for mental health law. Psychiatry, Psychology and
Law 2013; 20(3): 431–451.
Apparently reflecting this understanding of the Convention, the South
Australian model was designed to help participants exercise ‘autonomy’
as well as ‘self-determination’ in their lives. The final evaluation of the
project found that support ‘can build capacity to the extent that existing
Guardianship Orders were revoked.’ Wallace op. cit. note 12: 46.
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one’s own decisions is not sufficient for autonomy. In the
absence of interference, decisions can be more or less
autonomous depending on the degree to which the choice
is the product of, or consistent with, particular psycho-
logical features of the person – for example, reflectively
endorsed beliefs or desires,26 their personality as a
whole,27 or their underlying and enduring commitments.28
As Onora O’Neill expresses the idea, how autonomous a
decision is depends in part on how genuinely it expresses
‘the self or individuality of the person’, however this is
understood.29 The full extent of the capacities that under-
pin autonomy in this self-expression sense is disputed, but
those discussed include: reasoning that enables the coher-
ent pursuit of current desires, reflection on and endorse-
ment and rejection of desires, an ability to imaginatively
project oneself into the future, planning and policy
making, impulse control, and the ability to conceive of
one’s life as a whole.
It is this dimension of autonomy that is emphasized by
Verkerk and Maclean, with Verkerk focusing on capaci-
ties for self knowledge and making life plans, and
Maclean on capacities for reasoning. Their shared
concern, which is one also expressed by O’Neill, is that
the emphasis in medical ethics on protecting liberty –
resulting in a focus on the need for informed consent
procedures – overlooks the value of a choice being
autonomous in this sense that distinguishes among freely
made choices. The idea is that because self-expression can
be augmented through the involvement of others in per-
sonal decision-making, laws and guidance that guard too
strictly against the involvement of the healthcare profes-
sionals in patients’ decisions in fact run the risk of
obstructing autonomy.
The most straightforward way to understand the
moral basis of this kind of position is to think of it as
setting these two senses of autonomy against one
another, so that a balance must be struck between them.
According to such views, the balance has been tipped
too far in favour of protecting liberty, at the cost of
self-expression, and this should be redressed. However,
using the concept of autonomy to understand the moral
basis for the shift from substituted to supported deci-
sions outlined in the CRPD, suggests that it reflects
somewhat different evaluative commitments. The shift
seems to require two distinct moral arguments which
will be discussed in turn.
First, an argument is needed for the requirement that
states must make support available when a person has a
mental disability. As described above, the literature sur-
rounding the CRPD – like the medical ethics literature –
justifies support primarily with reference to the value of
autonomy in the self-expression sense.30 However, in the
Convention the requirement for support is made in the
context of a social model of disability, and this seems to
buttress the requirement in the following way. Applying
the social model to the concept of mental capacity sug-
gests that that there are no answers to questions of mental
capacity independent of a person’s social and political
environment. Context always forms part of the explana-
tion for a mental incapacity, and this gives force to the
requirement by implicating the state as partially respon-
sible when support was not available due to its laws or
policies. In this way, the social model of mental capacity
implicit in the Convention further develops the argu-
ments for supported decision-making that are found in
the medical ethics literature.
A further argument, however, is needed for the pro-
posed shift away from substituted decisions. The imple-
mentation of support fairly straightforwardly justifies a
shift, to the extent that a person should be allowed to
make their own decision when support enables them to
meet existing capacity standards.31 However, the shift
envisaged in the CRPD literature is often much more
substantial than this. Prominent commentators interpret
the Convention as requiring that the mental threshold for
the right to make one’s own decisions be significantly
lowered – for example, to an ability to express an inten-
tion that can be understood at least by those who know
the person.32 This proposal reflects a much greater com-
mitment to the importance of autonomy in sense of
making one’s own decisions, relative to existing law.
Gerard Quinn, for example,33 holds that the price of exist-
ing safeguards is too high to pay, because people with
mental disabilities lose the opportunity to create their
own life and to develop associated capacities, when life-
shaping decisions are made by others.34
26 A. Jaworska. Respecting the margins of agency: Alzheimer’s patients
and the capacity to value. Philos Public Aff 1999; 28(2): 105–138.
27 R. Dworkin. Life’s Dominion An Argument about Abortion, Euthana-
sia, and Individual Freedom. New York: Vintage Books; 1994. pp. 191–
192, 225–227.
28 A. Buchanan & D. Brock. Deciding for Others. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; 1989. p. 41.
29 O. O’Neill. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 2002. p. 34.
30 I note, however, that elements two and three of Bach and Kerzner’s
model appear designed to give the person’s will effect, however self-
expressive the decision may be.
31 This appears to be the approach implemented in the South Austral-
ian model.
32 M. Bach. The right to legal capacity under the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Key concepts and directions form law
reform, Toronto: Institute for Research and Development on Inclusion
and Society; 2009. This requirement is far less demanding than the
mental capacity test in the MCA, which refers to the ability to under-
stand and weigh and use relevant information. See also Bach and
Kerzner (op. cit. note 9).
33 G. Quinn. Seminar on Legal Capacity. European Foundation Centre,
Consortium on Human Rights and Disability, Brussels: 4 June; 2009.
34 This second argument highlights an often invisible relationship
between moral commitments and mental capacity standards. Mental
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An important consequence of the significant value
placed by the Convention on decision-making liberty, is
that this constrains its endorsement of decision-making
support. In contrast, the calls for support in the medical
ethics literature demphasise the importance of decision-
making liberty relative to self-expression, and this points
to a central difference between these two literatures.
Although both recognize the role that others can play in
supporting self-expression, their divergent moral com-
mitments suggest that they may yield very different
advice regarding what constitutes appropriate support.
The tension within the Convention, between its com-
mitment to decision-making liberty and its commitment
to decision-making support, also presents a practical
challenge.35 It suggests that putting the support required
by the Convention into practice involves a fine balance
of facilitating self-expression without compromising
decision-making freedom. Support always involves
others playing a role that moves the person in the sup-
porting role towards rather than away from clear cases of
morally problematic influence.36 However, the value
placed on decision-making liberty in the CRPD makes
the balancing task in this context particularly precarious.
The final two sections of this article set out the challenge,
and explore one way of navigating it.
SUPPORTING SELF-EXPRESSION
WITHOUT UNDERMINING FREEDOM
Self-expression might be facilitated in a range at ways,
which will be discussed here in the context of medical
decisions. One role, or part of the role, that a supporter
could play might be modeled on that of a genetic
counselor, helping someone understand complex infor-
mation such as the probabilistic results of a diagnostic
test. This kind of role could plausibly be carried out in a
way that does not constitute an attempt to influence the
patient’s decision, and under these circumstances it does
not seem to threaten the freedom of the subsequent
choice.
But support can also involve the giving of advice.37
This kind of involvement does seem to count, more
clearly, as an attempt to influence the decision. Yet intui-
tively it seems that this too could be done in a morally
unproblematic way. This might be true of a case where
the supporter strongly recommends a screening proce-
dure for cancer, on grounds that early detection signifi-
cantly increases the effectiveness of treatment. Even if
someone who is initially reticent is persuaded to have the
procedure, it seems possible to imagine this not involving
improper influence.
However, some models of supported decision-making
endorse the idea that engagement with the person’s
reasons for a choice can also facilitate autonomy, when
this means that a decision is more deeply considered,
the alternatives more fully explored. Alan Cribb and
Vikki Entwistle suggest that sometimes the best way to
support autonomy is by ‘questioning or even challenging
[the person’s] expressed or apparent preferences’.38
The worry about all but the first kind of involvement is
obvious, however, when considered in the context of a
woman’s decision about whether to have an abortion.39
The arguments just outlined are often given, in one form
or another, by pro-life organizations for making counsel-
ling a mandatory part of the consultation process prior to
an abortion being performed. The concern is that propo-
nents of counselling have a particular outcome in mind,
based on their own evaluative stance, and a parallel
concern arises in the context of a move from substituted
capacity tests set a threshold for the functioning that is necessary for a
person to be considered minimally autonomous (self-expressive) in rela-
tion to a particular decision (Richardson, op. cit. note 3: 91). But
autonomy in this sense comes in degrees. As suggested in the arguments
made by Maclean and Verkerk, a person who under existing law has
mental capacity, can nonetheless be helped to make a more self-
expressive decision through support. There is no bright line within this
range of mental abilities – the legal boundary between mental capacity
and incapacity is drawn on the basis of political commitments such as
the value placed on decision-making liberty. And as a result, different
societies (or the one society at different times) may draw the line in
different places on the basis of divergent evaluative commitments. A.
Buchanan. Mental capacity, legal competence and consent to treat-
ment. J R Soc Med 2004; 97: 415–420. J. Craigie, L. Bortolotti. in press.
Rationality, diagnosis and patient autonomy in psychiatry. In The
Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
35 In order to resolve this tension it might be argued that the commit-
ment to liberty in the convention applies only to formal coercion (sub-
stituted decisions). However, it seems unlikely that the drafters of the
CRPD were concerned only with interference in the formal sense, given
the evidence for the way in which informal practices in psychiatry can
also compromise decision-making freedom (K. Canvin, J. Rugkasa, J.
Sinclair & T. Burns. Leverage and other informal pressures in commu-
nity psychiatry in England. Int J Law Psychiatry 2011; 36: 100–106).
Piers Gooding suggests that the relevant parts of the Convention are
broadly concerned with respect for ‘a person’s sphere of freedom to
exercise choice’ (Gooding, op.cit. note 25: 436).
36 This point is often raised as a concern about the Convention. See, for
example: A. Ward. Abolition of all guardianship and mental health
laws? The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, 2014, online 14 Feb;
N.A. Koln & J. Blumenthal. A critical assessment of supported
decision-making for persons aging with intellectual disabilities. Disabil
Health J 2014; 7(1): S40–S43. The CRPD Committee recognises this
concern, commenting that ‘Undue influence is characterised where the
quality of the interaction between the support person and the person
being supported includes signs of fear, aggression, threat, deception or
manipulation.’ op. cit. note 2: 5.
37 This will particularly be the case if a professional is in the supporting
role, but I would suggest that people also often seek the advice from
friends and family.
38 A. Cribb & V. Entwistle. Shared decision making: trade-offs between
narrower and broader conceptions. Health Expectations 2011; 14: 210–
19: 213.
39 I thank Jonathan Glover for suggesting this contrast case.
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to supported decisions. The issue was described by a
standing committee of the New South Wales Parliament
in the following way:
An appointed guardian has a statutory mandate to
make decisions in the best interests of a person with a
disability. Is an assisted decision maker helping a
person to make the decision in accordance with his or
her views and wishes or to make what the assisted
decision maker may see as the ‘best or right decision’?
Many in the disability sector would argue that genuine
autonomy includes the right to make poor choices or
bad decisions.40
Given the value placed on decision-making liberty in
the Convention, ‘support’ might be interpreted merely as
giving the person’s expressed wishes effect, however
unwise or irrational they may be. But the CRPD litera-
ture clearly understands the purpose of support also as
facilitating autonomy in the self-expression sense. To this
extent it does endorse helping the person make a ‘good’
decision in a specific sense: part of the aim of support is to
help the person make a self-expressive decision. The chal-
lenge, therefore, is how to do this while ensuring that the
support does not undermine the person’s decision-
making freedom.
The solution that will be explored here is based on
Philip Pettit’s account of freedom as discursive control.41
The account proposes that the involvement of others
undermines decision-making freedom when it limits dis-
course about what the preexisting reasons relating to a
decision require. It is developed by Pettit as a way of
unifying two senses of freedom – one political, and one
psychological – which map closely onto the two senses of
autonomy discussed above. This unifying approach is
helpful for addressing the challenge at hand, because
what’s required is an explanation of how decision-
making liberty can be limited by others (limiting freedom
in a political sense), in a way that seems to require a
psychological explanation.
The discursive control account suggests that preserving
decision-making liberty requires that that the supporter
recognises the person being supported as a reason-giver
and reason-taker; and in doing so, authorises them as an
agent capable of engaging with these considerations.42
Modeled in this way, support may result in a change in a
person’s beliefs or even their motivations, without com-
promising their decision-making liberty.
In what follows, threats as clear cases of attempts to
influence that undermine decision-making liberty, are
used to explain how freedom is constrained on the dis-
cursive control view; and incentives are then considered
in relation to threats. While threats are very unlikely to be
recommended as a way of supporting decision-making in
accordance with the CRPD, the possibility that support
might be interpreted as involving an implicit threat
should be a serious consideration.43 Incentives also seem
unlikely to be endorsed as a way of supporting decisions
in line with the Convention, but financial incentives are
being trialed as a way of increasing compliance with anti-
psychotic medication.44 Therefore, in addition to serving
the purpose of illustrating how certain modes of influence
undermine decision-making liberty, the examination of
threats and incentives has direct relevance for the evalu-
ation of current psychiatric practice.
A DISCURSIVE CONTROL SOLUTION
Threats present a puzzle because they appear to restrict
decision-making freedom despite the person still being
able to make a choice, and without the range of available
options being restricted. In a discussion of informal coer-
cive practices in psychiatry, Terry Carney and colleagues
describe the effect that certain forms of social influence
can have on human agency as constraining ‘the size of the
remaining decisional ‘space’ ’.45 Explaining how decision-
making freedom (or the decisional space) is constrained,
is essential for developing advice to help ensure that the
support required by the Convention does not undermine
decision-making liberty in this way.
The discursive control account explains the freedom-
undermining effect of a threat primarily in terms of its
effect on the discursive relationship that can be had
between the person who makes the threat, and its recipi-
ent. According to Pettit, threats limit discourse by
‘[rigging] the reasons by which I, a coercer, want you to
be moved and show that I’m not content just to discourse
with you about what the preexisting considerations
require.’46 The reasons are rigged in the sense that the
threat increases the potential cost of not choosing a par-
ticular option. This constrains your ability to consider the
40 Standing Committee on Social Issues. 2010. Substitute decision-
making for people lacking capacity, New South Wales Parliament Leg-
islative Council. Sydney: s. 5.88.
41 P. Pettit. A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2001.
Chapter 4.
42 Ibid: 69.
43 For example see: K. Sheehan & T. Burns. Perceived coercion and the
therapeutic relationship. Psychiatr Serv 2011; 62: 471–476.
44 D. Classon. Financial Incentives for antipsychotic depot medication,
J Med Ethics 2007; 33: 189–193. One justification given for such inter-
ventions is that they support autonomy by helping people achieve their
longer-term or more core goals. For a full discussion of this issue see:
R. Ashcroft. Personal financial incentives in health promotion: where
do they fit in the ethic of autonomy? Health Expectations 2011; 13:
191–200.
45 T. Carney, D. Tait & S. Touyz. ‘Coersion is Coersion?: Reflection on
clinical trends in use of compulsion in treatment of anorexia nervosa
patients’ Legal Studies Research Paper 2008, No. 08/09 Sydney Law
School: 9.
46 Pettit, op. cit. note 41: 74.
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preexisting reasons for choosing one option or another,
making it more difficult for you to respond only to those
features of the options. The degree to which a threat has
this effect depends on the salience of the cost – how much
you want to avoid the consequences. But whatever the
cost, threats severely limit the conversation that can be
had regarding the treatment options. It will be difficult, if
not impossible, for the person who makes the threat to
present themselves as a co-reasoner who is authorising
the person being supported, as an agent.47
Using this account to consider incentives as an intui-
tively less problematic form of influence, further explores
the proposal. The discursive control account provides an
explanation for the intuition that incentives are less
morally problematic than threats in terms of their impact
on decision-making liberty. But it also suggests that this
isn’t necessarily the case. Where an incentive has been
introduced, by not choosing in accordance with the
incentive a patient incurs an opportunity cost – the cost
of foregoing something desirable.48 In general, threats
have a more disruptive effect on a person’s ability to
engage with and respond to the preexisting features of the
options, compared to incentives, because human psychol-
ogy is more sensitive to costs than opportunity costs: it is
a robust finding that people are more keen to avoid
costs.49 But while opportunity costs are generally more
easily disregarded, it seems that extremely desirable
incentives will have a disruptive effect that is equivalent
to, or even greater than the effect of some threats.50 A
significant financial incentive offered to a person who is
unable to earn money may make it very difficult for them
to reflect on the decision in terms of the preexisting fea-
tures of the options, for example to weigh the potential
side-effects against the benefits of treatment.51
Despite this possibility, Pettit is relatively unconcerned
about the potential impact of incentives on the discursive
relationship, especially in cases where the incentive is
aimed at helping the person make a decision that is in
their declared interests.52 However, considering incentives
in a context where the person making the decision has a
mental disability, suggests that incentives will sometimes
be much less benign that Pettit imagines. Even incentives
that aim to facilitate self-expression send a message that
calls into doubt the recipient’s ability to engage in dis-
course about, or to act on, the pre-existing reasons for a
decision. Recognition as a co-reasoner and authorisation
as an agent is, to some degree, withheld. And against a
background where the person being supported has strug-
gled for recognition because of a mental disability, there
is reason to think they may be particularly sensitive to
this potentially discourse unfriendly signal.53
Pettit’s discursive control account draws a connection
between the discursive relationship and decision-making
freedom at a particular moment in time. But it seems
likely that a history of not being fully recognised as an
agent will also have a more long-term impact, compro-
mising the development of, or eroding the person’s per-
ception of themself as an agent, and therefore their
capacities for self-respect and self-trust.54 These kinds of
capacities are a central focus of relational accounts of
autonomy, and the arguments for their importance are
made in great detail in that literature.55 In one influential
account, Catriona Mackenzie argues that autonomy
requires a person to regard ‘herself as the legitimate
source of authority – as able, and authorized, to speak
for herself’, and that, ‘such attitudes towards oneself
can only be sustained in relations of intersubjective
recognition.’56
I suggest, in a commonsense way, that this will be an
experience that is familiar to many people: that such
capacities seem essential for the ability to assert oneself –
one’s beliefs, feelings, preferences or wishes. The pro-
posed relevance of these capacities for decision-making
freedom,57 and the role played by recognition in develop-
ing and sustaining them, suggests that people with mental
disabilities who are making a transition from substituted
to supported decisions may be in a particularly vulner-
able position – not because of a mental impairment
47 Pettit, op. cit. note 41: 75.
48 Pettit, op. cit. note 41: 75. An opportunity cost leaves the person no
worse off if they do not choose in accordance with the offer. For a
review of approaches to understanding the distinction between threats
and offers see: G. Szmukler & P. Appelbaum. Treatment pressures,
leverage, coercion and compulsion in mental health care. J Ment Health
2008; 17(3): 233–244.
49 D. Kahneman & A. Tversky. Choices, values and frames. Am
Psychol 1984; 34.
50 Pettit, op. cit. note 41: 75.
51 Szmukler & Appelbaum, op cit. note 48. Furthermore, because the
impact on decision-making freedom depends on the recipient’s percep-
tion of the intervention, something that is intended as an incentive may
be experienced as (and have the impact of) a threat, for example, if an
‘offer’ involves something that the person feels they are entitled to, or is
in some sense already theirs (Ashcroft. op. cit. note 44).
52 Pettit. op. cit. note 41: 75.
53 Here I am borrowing Pettit’s turn of phrase.
54 A loss of functioning, for example, due to dementia or during a severe
depression may lead to an erosion of these capacities due to the with-
drawal of recognition as an agent.
55 For example: P. Besnson. Free Agency and Self-Worth. J Philos
1994; 91: 650–658; P. Benson. Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization.
Social Theory and Practice 1991; 17: 385–408; J. Anderson & A.
Honneth. Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice. In J.
Christman, J. Anderson, editors. Autonomy and the Challenges to Lib-
eralism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005. 127–149; T.
Govier. Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem, Hypatia 1993; 8(1):
99–120.
56 C. Mackenzie. Relational autonomy, normative authority and per-
fectionism. J Soc Philos 2008; 39(4): 512–533: 514.
57 ‘Freedom’ here is being used to refer primarily to the political sense
of the word, described (following Pettit) in a psychological way.
‘Freedom’ could equally be substituted with ‘autonomy’ as discussed in
earlier sections of the paper, referring primarily to autonomy as liberty.
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(though this may also be the case), but because of their
existing legal and social environment, and the impact that
this may have had on their perception of themselves as an
agent. An awareness of the importance of capacities for
self-respect and self-trust, and a focus on their develop-
ment through discursive relationships, therefore seems to
be an important part of any move from substituted to
supported decisions.
Gerard Quinn suggests that concerns about the
support required by the Convention becoming improper
influence are given too much weight, on grounds that we
are all susceptible:
[We] tend to agonize over the hidden dangers of sup-
ported decision making – the ease with which the
‘other’ is not just invested in but absorbs the ‘self’. Can
we draw lines to ensure that supports do not become
substitutes? Well, my point is that this affects all of us
and not just those for whom a formalized system of
support is put in place. Is there something about
persons with intellectual disabilities that makes them
maybe more prone to this ‘capture’? Maybe the threat
exists in a stronger form in the context of intellectual
disability – but it is actually a threat we all navigate
daily in our lives. Depending on the relationship in
question we are all deeply impressionable.58
Quinn may be right that most of us are deeply impres-
sionable. Nonetheless, the above analysis makes the case
that there are (at least) two reasons to take this issue
particularly seriously in the context of support required
by the CRPD. One is the importance placed on decision-
making liberty in the Convention. This makes imple-
menting the support it requires a more challenging
balancing act relative to the support endorsed more
broadly in the medical ethics literature. Support will tip
into improper influence more easily, because degrees or
modes of influence that may more generally be consid-
ered acceptable, will be judged unacceptable as a way of
implementing support in accordance with the CRPD.
Second, the discursive control account as further devel-
oped above, suggests that mental disability will be asso-
ciated with a particular vulnerability to discourse-
undermining forms of engagement. While Quinn frames
this concern in terms of susceptibility due to a mental
impairment, the above account focuses attention on sus-
ceptibility due to a history of interpersonal engagement
where a person with mental disability has not been rec-
ognised as a legal agent; and how freedom may be under-
mined due to the impact of this experience on the person’s
perception of themselves as an agent.
CONCLUSION
The CRPD forces a reconsideration of the principle of
respect for patient autonomy in two ways. First, it chal-
lenges prevailing ideas about when the principle applies,
by requiring that its scope be widened to include people
with mental disabilities whose decisions are currently
made by others. Second, its challenge to the concept of
mental incapacity, and subsequent focus on support, will
stimulate the existing debate about what respect for
patient autonomy requires.
It was argued that the support required by the Conven-
tion is based on a valuing of autonomy in the sense of
self-expression, but that this is combined with a very
significant commitment to autonomy in the sense of
decision-making liberty. This second evaluative commit-
ment distinguishes endorsements of decision-making
support in the CRPD literature from those in the existing
medical ethics literature. And the combination of commit-
ments expressed in the Convention (or at least in promi-
nent interpretations of the Convention) identifies a
particular challenge in putting its requirement for support
in practice.59
The discursive control account described above offers a
starting point for developing practical advice on how to
navigate the territory between merely giving a person’s
expressed preference effect (which runs the risk of limit-
ing autonomy in terms of self-expression); and the impos-
ing of a decision in a patient’s best interests (which denies
autonomy in the sense of the liberty to make one’s own
decisions). It suggests that assessments of whether
support jeopardizes decision-making freedom should pay
attention to its effect on the person’s ability to respond to
the pre-existing features of the options; and the discourse
that can be had between the supporter and the person
being supported, regarding those features.
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